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Abstract: Taking the case of lone parenthood, the paper examines an argument that has exerted
extraordinary influence on recent policymaking, and finds that it is probably not correct.  The
argument holds that limiting cash benefits for lone parents, and strengthening their communities,
will discourage lone parenthood in two ways: directly, by raising the price of lone parenthood,
and indirectly, by making norms against lone parenthood more harsh.  The norm effect is often
held to be more important than the price effect.  Using a simple model of policy and endogenous
social norms, however, this paper shows that cutting welfare and empowering communities makes
norms more tolerant, not less.  The reason is simple: both policies lower the net benefit of having
a harsh norm against lone parenthood.  Cutting welfare lowers the anti-tax benefit of such a norm,
while strengthening communities increases its enforcement cost.  Everyone desires softer norms;
competition among cultural leaders forces them to call for tolerance.  The tolerance effect can be
strong enough to overwhelm the price effects, so that lone parenthood can increase rather than
decrease.
In its methods, the paper contributes a new approach to predicting short-run cultural
change.  Culture is a coordination problem, solved by the suggestions of those in positions of
cultural leadership.  Competition for office restricts the discretion of those who win.  As a result,
cultural markers like norms and symbols gravitate toward common sense.  Here, "common sense"
is interpreted as the median of the distribution of ideal coordination equilibria.  As policies affect
the benefits and costs of different equilibria, it changes this distribution and hence, through
cultural competition, the equilibrium that is ultimately selected.  1
I. Welfare Reform and Cultural Change
In recent years, many social observers have concluded that the weakness of community
life in the U.S. has allowed social problems to grow out of control (Putnam, 1995; Ehrenhalt,
1995; Kaus, 1992; Wilson, 1991).  Among economists and policy scholars, such perceptions have
led to growing interest in the relationship between policy and culture (Aaron, Mann, and Taylor,
1993; Lindbeck, 1994).  They have also exerted considerable influence on public policies,
especially those concerning the breakdown of the family (Ermisch, 1990; Sawhill, 1995).  Welfare
reform proposals on both left and right share a broad strategy: to limit cash assistance for lone
parents, and to strengthen communities (Congressional Quarterly, 1996; Peirce, 1996).
1
Limiting welfare reduces cash incentives, while empowering communities makes people
more dependent on one another, raising the cost of violating norms against lone parenthood. 
Thus, both policies raise the price of lone parenthood and therefore should decrease it. 
Proponents rely on more than price effects to make their case, however.  It is claimed that the
low-cash, strong-village approach to welfare reform will not only enforce standing norms better, it
will move norms toward less tolerance of lone parenthood.  Going under names like "restoring
values," the indirect norm effect is thought to be more fundamental than any price effects.
2 
Because the two effects work in the same direction, lone parenthood rates are presumably certain
to fall under this strategy, and possibly most of the decline will be due to norms rather than
welfare cuts or community interdependence.  Though plausible, the argument has not been
presented in formal terms. 
The theory presented here, however, shows that the argument is probably not true. 
Restricting cash grants and building communities does cause the norm system to change, but not2
so as to discourage lone parenthood.  Rather, norms become more tolerant, not less.  The low-
cash, strong-village strategy thus has direct price effects that are opposed by indirect norm effects. 
As a result, it is not certain that this strategy will reduce lone parenthood.  
The logic behind this finding is straightforward.  Norms against socially costly behavior
produce benefits by discouraging costly behavior, but they produce costs because they have to be
enforced by someone.  If norms tend to reflect the middle-ground interests of the citizens, a policy
that lessens the social costs of "bad" behavior will make norms softer.  A policy that makes people
more interdependent, and thereby raises the costs of enforcing the norm, will also make norms
softer.  A low-cash, strong-village approach to welfare reform does both of these, and therefore
will induce softer norms, not tougher ones.  
Moreover, the paper shows that norm systems may be extremely and unintuitively
sensitive to small policy changes.  Thus while it is not impossible to reduce lone parenthood using
welfare reform proposals now being considered, it will be more difficult than proponents realize,
in two senses.  It will be more difficult because the norm system will resist policy intent, and
because the norm system introduces considerable uncertainty about ultimate policy effects. 
The paper makes its argument in eight sections.  Section II provides an overview of the
theory and its connections existing literature.  Section III presents a lone parenthood model with
fixed social norms.  Section IV introduces cultural competition over the placement of such a
norm.  Section V derives the distribution of ideal norms in the population under the assumption of
linear utility.  Section VI analyzes the implications of the model for lone parent cash assistance
policies.  Section VII considers the effects of stronger communities.  Section VIII draws broader
conclusions.  An appendix proves the existence of the equilibrium in Section IV.
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II. Overview: Policy In A Theory of Cultural Change
A. Formal theories of conformity.  The emergence and stability of social conformity has
been the subject of many theoretical papers (Akerlof, 1980; Bernheim, 1994; Hardin, 1990; Boyd
and Richerson, 1990; Bikhchandani et al., 1992; Young, 1993; Kandori, 1992; Kandori, Mailath
and Rob, 1993), yet the literature has not concerned itself with policy questions and,
understandably, is not well suited to do so.  Moreover, much of the focus is on very long-run
dynamics, and in the very long run policies are endogenous. 
Adopting a short-run focus allows the analysis of exogenous policies, but it raises the issue
that culture is a coordination problem with no obvious theoretical solution (Kreps, 1990, Bird,
1995).  Precedents and signals solve these problems by moving particular cultural markers into
prominence (Greif, 1994; Calvert, 1992; Schelling, 1960).  Signals, especially, play an important
role: those who can communicate common-knowledge suggestions can create expectations that
the suggested acts will be done by all.  Such expectations then induce equilibrium on the
suggested behavior.
The existence of property rights over the technology of common-knowledge suggestion
allows a role for policy in the evolution of culture.  Presumably, such rights can be transferred,
and therefore competition will dissipate the power of suggestion.  For example, though the
President has great power to shape culture through the bully pulpit, electoral pressures limit the
suggestions that can actually be made while retaining that power.
4  The influence of policies on
these limits has not yet been explored, but some such influence seems implicit in recent welfare
reform debates.  The basic goal of this paper is to develop a formal model which identifies the
effect of specific welfare reform proposals on cultural change.  4
B. Basic principles.  Such a model can be built up from a few uncontroversial assumptions
about the operation and purpose of norms in society.  First, norms produce social benefits by
discouraging behavior that is socially costly.  Second, they produce costs because they have to be
enforced by someone.  Generally, punishments are costly for both the giver and the receiver. 
Third, the balance of these benefits and costs is respected by cultural leaders because of the
competition they face.  Lastly, policies affect the benefits and costs of norms and thereby the
conditions under which cultural competition proceeds.  Through this sequence of interests and
institutions, policies change norms.
C. Formal model: Overview.  In a large society, citizens choose whether or not to be lone
parents on the basis of their private benefits and costs.  Single parenthood imposes extra costs,
but some citizens gain positive utility from it.  If poor, lone parents also receive a government
grant.  This creates a social cost of taxation, borne by the non-poor.  
To help reduce this burden, the non-poor have erected a norm against lone parenthood. 
The norm states that those who are "too poor" to support a child should not be lone parents.  The
definition of "too poor" (i.e. the income cut-off below which lone parenthood is considered
"wrong") is a coordination problem, because any income level within a certain range serves
equally well.  To solve this coordination problem, the citizens look to elected leaders, who, from
the bully pulpit, announce a common-knowledge signal that defines "too poor."  The leaders are
constrained by election pressures to announce the definition that maximizes the well-being of the
median voter.  
Once the norm is determined, the citizens enforce it during repeated prisoner's dilemma
(RPD) encounters with one another.  Anyone who encounters someone who has violated the5
social norm will play "Always Defect" against them, creating costs for both violator and punisher. 
The median voter, who is a taxpayer on the one hand and a neighbor or friend on the other, faces
a trade-off between these norm-enforcement costs and the benefit of reducing tax burdens.  Public
policies affect the size of these costs in two ways: by changing the size of welfare grants, and by
building or destroying community (i.e. changing the RPD payoffs).  These policies have a direct
effect on behavior, but they also change the preferences of the median voter, which changes
norms and indirectly changes behavior.  To examine specific policy changes, the paper relies on a
piecewise linear utility version of the model with two marginal utilities of income, poor and non-
poor. 
III. Lone Parenthood Decisions Under a Fixed Norm
A. Lone parenthood decisions.  Society consists of M people, indexed i = 1, ..., M, M
large and odd, each endowed with an exogenous income yi.  Income provides utility according to
the function u(y), with u' > 0, u" < 0.  Each person may choose to be a lone parent (choose Fi = 1)
or not (Fi = 0).  Compared to other states, lone parenthood is more expensive, with cost c.  At the
same time, lone parenthood increases utility for some and decreases it for others; let the utility
increment of lone parenthood be si.  The population is distributed uniformly and independently on
[y1, y2] and [s1, s2], with s1 negative, s2 positive, and y1 approximately zero.
5  
Lone parents with income below the poverty line, B, receive a welfare grant g; both are
exogenous.  This policy emulates the main U.S. low-income support program, Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC), which primarily helps only low-income lone parents.  Studies
of AFDC recipients show that its grants are not so generous that it is possible to make money by
having children (Jencks, 1992), so assume c > g.  Those with incomes above the poverty line pay6
a lump-sum tax, J, to cover the costs of welfare.  If there are L poor lone parents, the total tax
burden is Lg.  Of the M individuals in the population, P are poor and R are non-poor.  The
poverty rate p equals P/M; let r = 1-p.  Let l = L/N be the poverty lone-parenthood rate.  With
these definitions, the lump-sum tax on the non-poor is J = gl/r.
6  
The non-poor will choose lone parenthood if s > u(y-J) - u(y-J-c).  The poor will do so if s
> u(y) - u(y-c+g).  Each income y is associated with a single parenthood utility s(y), such that an
individual with income y and utility s(y) will be indifferent to single parenthood.  The function s(y)
is discontinuous at y = B.  Figure 1 illustrates.  The dotted box shows the bounds of the
population distribution; let the area of this box, (y2-y1)*(s2-s1), be normalized to equal 1.  The
lone parenthood rate in the entire population is equal to the area of regions R1 and R2.  The rate
among the poor is the area of R1.  An increase in AFDC grants shifts s(y) downward when
income is below the poverty line; lone parenthood in R1 increases.  
B. Norms against lone parenthood.  Now consider the possibility that a norm indicates
when lone parenthood is "right" and when it is "wrong."  Drawing on formal definitions of norms
offered elsewhere (Crawford and Ostrom, 1995; Coleman, 1990), let the norm be exogenous,
discrete, and defined in terms of one characteristic, income.
7  Then, people with incomes below
some income level N will be doing something "wrong" if they become lone parents.  This kind of
norm structure reflects a view that lone parenthood can become "wrong" only if it creates burdens
for society at large, as, for example, when low-income single parents need cash assistance.
Being defined on income, the norm is a point in [y1, y2].  It is reasonable, however, to
assume y1 # N # B.
8  The higher the value of N, the harsher the norm in the sense that the label
"wrong" would be applied to the decisions of a larger number of people.  It is important to7
distinguish the softening of the norm from a change in the power of enforcement.  A harsh norm
may or may not be strongly enforced; a strong norm may or may not be harsh.  Harshness is a
function of the position of the norm, while strength is a function of the costs of violation.  
The existence of the norm creates two groups of lone parents among the poor.  For those
with incomes between N and B, lone parenthood is not "wrong" but is tolerated.  If Q is the
number of tolerated lone parents among the poor, then q = Q/M is the poverty tolerated lone
parenthood rate.  For those with incomes below N, lone parenthood is "wrong" and lone parents
are violators of the social norm.  Similarly, if there are V violations, then v = V/M is the
population violation rate.  The rate of poverty lone parenthood is l = v + q.  To reduce verbiage in
what follows, the term "lone parenthood" will be used instead of "poverty lone parenthood."
C. Neighborhoods.  Though the norm exists somewhere between y1 and B, it does not
automatically have an effect on behavior (in particular, it is not internalized and is not a part of
preferences).  Rather, society enforces the norm through interdependent interactions
("neighborhoods"), much as in Calvert's community of rational actors (1991).  Let N be common
knowledge and consider the following game.  In Stage 0, all members of society observe N, and
choose whether or not to be single parents.  Then, nature draws N < M individuals randomly from
the joint distribution of incomes and single parenthood utilities; these N individuals form that
person's neighborhood.
9  Each player observes the incomes and parenting choices of all the other
players in her neighborhood.  In Stage 1, each player plays the following prisoner's dilemma game












Cooperate z, z -1, 2z
Defect 2z, -1 0, 0
The first entry in each cell is row's payoff, and z > 0.  Stages 2, ..., 4 repeat Stage 1.  To keep
strategies simple in this repeated prisoner's dilemma (RPD), mixed strategies and strategies that
depend on actions taken in games between other players are not allowed.  An RPD which results
in perpetual cooperation yields Z = z/(1-*), where * is the time preference rate, identical for all
players.  RPDs which result in perpetual defection yield 0.  If x percent of a player's neighbors
cooperate and 1-x percent defect, the player receives 
(1-x)NZ utils from her neighborhood.  
Two parameters measure the importance of community for each person.  If a person is
isolated, has few neighbors (in the sense of people close enough to observe income with some
accuracy), or is largely independent of others, then N is small.  If the typical interactions one has
with one's neighbors are not very important, then Z is small.
10  
D. Equilibria.  1. Objective functions.  Payoffs are received at the end of a given stage. 
For the non-poor, the objective function in the game is
where wij equals the discounted payoff of the RPD game between i and another player j.  For the
poor, the objective function is:
2. Equilibrium concept.  Standard equilibrium concepts applied to this game will require9
Stage 0:  yi < N:  Choose Fi = 1 iff si > u(yi) - u(yi - (c - g)) + (1-vi)NZ
N # yi < B:  Choose Fi = 1 iff si > u(yi) - u(yi - (c - g))
yi $ B: Choose Fi = 1 iff si > u(yi - Ji) - u(yi - c - Ji)
Stages 1, 2, ...
If i is a conformist: Play 'Tit for Tat' against conformists and 'Always Defect' against
violators.  If i is a violator: Play 'Always Defect' against everyone.  
Expectations:
vi = v, all i, where v is the actual violation rate that results from stage 0 strategies.
Ji = J, all i, where J is the actual tax that results from stage 0 strategies.
Box 1. Cultural Coordination Equilibrium Enforcing A Fixed Norm
that strategies should be best responses under rational expectations (common expectations that
are not systematically wrong).  
3. Strategy spaces.  Because each RPD game is assumed to proceed independently of all
others, strategy spaces are simplified.
11  Let M = [y1, B] be the set of possible norms; let Q = [0, 1]
be the set of possible lone parenthood decisions; let S = [y1, y2] be the set of possible incomes; let
) = {Cooperate, Defect} be the set of possible choices in each stage of an RPD.  The history of
play with respect to a given opponent at the beginning of stage t is denoted ht, an element of the
set Ht.  For t > 0, Ht = M × Q
2 × S × )
2(t-1).  A strategy with respect to a given opponent consists
of two elements: a map from M into Q in stage 0, and a sequence of maps from Ht into ) in stages
1 and higher.  Each player develops N such strategies, each calling for the same move in stage 0.
4. Equilibrium selection.  The game obviously has many equilibria, including "ignore
norms": parenting strategies ignore RPD strategies, and RPD strategies ignore parenting
strategies.  The strategies and expectations in Box 1, however, constitute an equilibrium in which
norms matter.  It makes use of a number of new definitions and symbols: 10
a) Status definitions. Let any player with F = 1 and y < N be a violator of the norm.  A
conformist is not a violator.  
b) Symbols for expected values.  In stage 0, player i expects the violation rate to be vi and
the tax burden of lone parenthood to be Ji.  
c) RPD strategy definitions.  The RPD strategy 'Tit for Tat' requires cooperation in the
first stage.  In each stage thereafter, the player does what her opponent did in the previous stage. 
The strategy 'Always Defect' requires the player to defect in each stage.  
5. Sketch of proof.  As is well known, 'Tit for Tat' and 'Always Defect' are mutual best
responses.  Two players in 'Tit for Tat' equilibrium cooperate forever; they receive a discounted
RPD payoff of Z.  Two players perpetually defecting receive 0.  At the start of an RPD,
conformists expect 'Tit for Tat' from conformists (a status that can be observed) and 'Always
Defect' from violators, to which the assigned strategies are best responses.  Violators expect
'Always Defect' from everyone; they find it best to play 'Always Defect' against everyone.  Each
neighborhood is a random draw from the population, therefore the objective expected rate of
violation in each neighborhood is v.  The RPD provides total payoffs of (1-v)NZ to conformists,
and 0 to violators.  In Stage 0, potential violators (those with incomes below the norm) use a
parenting strategy that reflects the expected payoff difference: the utility threshold required to
induce lone parenthood is higher by (1-vi)NZ.  A full proof requires that expected violation rates
and tax burdens equal the actual outcomes.  It will be deferred until after section IV.
E. Discussion.  This fixed-norm equilibrium matches our intuition by putting a social price
on  lone parenthood when income is "too low."  The price is the result of breakdowns in
cooperative arrangements between a norm violator and those she encounters.  When greatly11
tolerated, lone parenthood creates high tax burdens (gl/r) but low norm enforcement costs (vNZ). 
When not tolerated, it creates low tax burdens but high enforcement costs.
12   
IV. Endogenous Norms and Cultural Competition
Members of society have an interest in balancing the enforcement costs of harsh norms
against the tax costs of soft norms.  That interest gets expressed through mechanisms of cultural
competition.
A. Norms as coordination problems.  At heart, cultural competition is a struggle for the
power to induce coordination equilibria.  Leaders of various institutions (government, arts, media,
religion) own rights to the technology of common-knowledge suggestions that induce cultural
coordination, including social norms.  Competition over this access encourages suggestions that
are not too extreme, so that norms gravitate toward "common sense."  Common sense, in turn,
balances the benefits of norms against their costs.  Each person's utility function tells us the norm
that they would prefer.  There is a distribution of such ideal norms; cultural competition pushes
the effective social norm toward its center.
13  
B. Electoral competition.  These ideas can be implemented in a simple way through the
median-voter theorem.  Two new players, A and B, are candidates for election to the office of
"Leader."  At the beginning of the game, both candidates make simultaneous announcements of
norms somewhere between y1 and y2.  These announcements are common knowledge.  After the
announcements, all the other players cast a vote for A or B.  The candidate who wins receives a
payoff of 1.  The candidate who loses receives 0.  Announcements and candidacy are otherwise
costless.  Once in office, the Leader has no influence on anyone's utility during the remainder of
play.  In particular, the Leader has no influence over policy parameters, which remain12
exogenous.
14  As a result, voting strategies only take account of the one observable difference
between the candidates, their norm announcements.
15  Let voters be sincere; all vote for the
candidate whose announcement maximizes their well-being given the voting, parenting, and
cooperation strategies of the other players.  
C. Strategy spaces and strategies.  The stages of the game now are as follows.
Stage 0: A and B make announcements " and $; " and $ are common knowledge.
Stage 1: Players vote for A or B.  The candidate with the most votes wins the election. 
The election outcome is common knowledge.
Stage 2: Players choose single parenthood, or not.
Stages 3, 4, ... 4: Players meet with N randomly-selected other players, observe their
incomes and parenting choices, and play RPDs with them.  
The candidates' strategy space is S.  For players, let the space of possible votes be h = {A,
B}.  For t = 1, the set of possible histories is H1 = S
2; for t = 2, it is H2 = S
2 × h
M.  In the first RPD
stage, history is an element of H3 = S
2 × h
M × Q
2 × S.  At all later stages of a given RPD game,
history is an element of Ht = S
2 × h
M × Q
2 × S × )
2(t-1).  
For candidates, a strategy is simply a choice in S.  For players, a strategy with respect to a
given opponent now consists of three parts: a map from H1 into h in stage 1, a map from H2 into
Q in stage 2, and a stream of maps from Ht into ) in stages 3 and higher.  As before, each player
develops N such strategies.
D. Equilibrium selection.  Applying the same equilibrium requirements as in Section III,
there are again some interesting and some uninteresting equilibria.  The strategies and
expectations in Box 2 constitute an equilibrium that supports the intuition that the winners of13
Stage 0: " = NA
e, $ = NB
e.
Stage 1:  Vote for A if Uin(") > Uin($); vote for B if Uin(") < Uin($); vote for A with
probability 1/2 if Uin(") = Uin($), all i, and n = r,p.  
Stage 2:  y < 8:  Choose Fi = 1 iff si > u(yi) - u(yi - (c - g)) + (1-vi)NZ;
8 # y < B:  Choose Fi = 1 iff si > u(yi) - u(yi - (c - g));
y $ B: Choose Fi = 1 iff si > u(yi - Ji) - u(yi - c - Ji), for all i.
Stages 3, 4, ... : If player i is a conformist: Play "Tit for Tat" against conformists and





*, j = A, B; implies 8 = N
*.
vi = v, Ji = J, all i.  
Box 2. Cultural Coordination Equilibrium Under Cultural Competition
competitions for cultural power are also the ones who set the norms.  The equilibrium uses the
definitions and symbols of the equilibrium in Section III.  It also makes use of the following: 
1. Expected medians in stage 0.  Let N
* be the median of the distribution of norms that
maximize the utility of the players, conditional on the equilibrium strategies.  Let Nj
e, j = A, B be
candidate j's stage 0 expectation of N
*, conditional on the strategies of the voters.
2. Expectations when voting in stage 1.  Let J("), Fi("), and wij(") respectively be the
stage 1 expectations of the tax burden, parenting decision, and payoff against opponent j that will
occur in subsequent stages, conditional on all strategies and the event that candidate A's
announcement becomes the social norm.  For the non-poor, let Uir(") = u(y - cFi(") - J(")) + sFi(")
+ Ewij(") be player i's stage 1 expected utility conditional on this event.  Let Uip(") = u(y - (c -
g)Fi(")) + sFi(") + Ewij(") be expected utility for the poor.  Define Uir($) and Uip($) similarly. 
3. Stage 2 status given voting outcomes.  Let 8 be the social norm announced in stage 0 by14
the candidate who receives a majority of the votes in stage 1.  Conformists and violators are
defined with respect to 8.  Expectations vi and Ji similarly are a function of 8.
E. Sketch of proof.  The argument presented in section III made the claim that strategies
in stages 2 and above are best responses with rational expectations for a fixed norm.  Here, that
norm is identified as 8, which in turn depends on strategies in stages 0 and 1.  Voter strategies
require them to vote for the candidate whose announced norm would maximize their utility.  If
norm preferences are single-peaked, announcing the median of the distribution of ideal norms is
the only equilibrium strategy.  Therefore both candidates announce the median norm.  Voters are
indifferent and vote randomly; regardless of who wins, the median norm becomes the effective
social norm in stages 2 and above.  The appendix contains a complete existence proof.
V. Ideal Norms
1. Linear utility: A graphical illustration.  To develop intuition about how the equilibrium
works, let the utility function u(.) be piecewise linear.  For the non-poor, utility is u(x) = Dx; for
the poor, it is u(x) = (x, with ( > D. 
Figure 2 shows the equilibrium strategies.  The dotted box shows the distribution of the
population; for simplicity, assume y1 = 0.  The horizontal lines indicate the level of lone-
parenthood utility that makes individuals indifferent between being a lone parent and not.  For the
non-poor, linear utility implies s(y) = u(y - J) - u(y - c - J) = Dc.  This is indicated in Figure 2 by
the horizontal line at Dc between B and y2.  Non-poor individuals whose mix of lone parent utility
and income puts them in region R5 will be lone parents; those in R6 will not.
For poor individuals, lone parenthood requires greater incremental utility because of the
higher marginal utility of income, but lower because of the presence of lone parent support, so15
v ’ N(s2 & ((c&g) & (1&v)NZ) (3)
q ’ (B & N)(s2 & ((c&g)) (4)
v ’ N(s2 & ((c&g) & NZ)
1 & NNZ
(5)
s(y) = ((c-g).  (The figure assumes the income effect dominates the grant effect.)  People with
incomes below the norm must also overcome the loss of cooperation, so that s(y) = ((c-g) + (1-
v)NZ.  These restrictions indicate that poor people in regions R1 and R3 will be lone parents;
those in R2 and R4 will not.  
2. Violation rates and the social feedback effect.  The violation rate is the ratio of the area
of R1 to the area of the entire box (which has been normalized to one):
while the tolerated lone parenthood rate is the area of R3:
Note that, in (3), norm violation feeds on itself: as more people violate the norm, more norm
violation is encouraged.  The closed-form solution for the violation rate is
The quantity NNZ > 0 is the social feedback multiplier, which measures the intensity with which
norm violation encourages further norm violations.  If the multiplier is near 0, small changes in
parameters cause small changes in the violation rate; if it is near 1, they cause large changes and
the norm system is unstable.  
3. Ideal norms for the non-poor.  With these formulas we can derive the distribution of
ideal norms in the population.  The non-poor, all conformists, achieve total utility U = D(y - cF - J)
+ sF + (1-v)NZ.



















(vNZ) and the tax burden J = gl/r.  Maximizing utility with respect to N yields the first order
condition 
Using equations (4) and (5) and the fact that l = v + q, we have 
and
Using these formulas, solving (6) for N yields N
*, the ideal norm of the non-poor voter.  In the
linear case, N
* does not depend on any individual-specific parameters, hence N
* is common to all
non-poor citizens.  
The ideal norm solution to equation (6) balances two effects involving tax burdens and
enforcement costs.  The first term is the tax benefit of increasing the norm.  In the usual case,
raising the norm discourages lone parenthood (Ml/MN < 0 - see below), and this lowers tax burdens
on the non-poor.  The second term is the norm enforcement cost of increasing the norm.  Raising
the norm increases violation rates (Mv/MN > 0 - see below), and this generates more cooperation
breakdowns for the non-poor.  Each non-poor player desires a norm that equates these costs. 
Since norms below 0 do nothing more to reduce enforcement costs while norms above poverty do
nothing more to reduce tax burdens, N
* lies on [0, B]. 
4. Ideal norms for the poor.  Poor people bear no tax burden, so raising the norm offers17
them no tax relief.  Lowering the norm decreases enforcement costs and, for those who choose to
be single parents, can switch status from violator to conformist.  Therefore decreases in the norm
always raise utility.  The ideal norm for the poor is always 0.  
Overall, the distribution of ideal norms is degenerate at zero if (6) yields a corner solution
at 0.  If (6) yields a solution greater than zero, the distribution is bimodal at 0 and some number N
*
greater than 0 but no greater than the poverty line.
17  Assuming that fewer people are poor than
non-poor, the bimodal case puts the median norm at N
*.  The degenerate case puts the median at
zero.  
5. Comparative statics: Signing key derivatives.  To determine the net impact of changes
in lone parent support and community-building on lone parenthood, it is necessary to compare the
direct effects on individual incentives with the indirect effects that operate through changes in the
social norm.  Under linear utility, (6) can be solved for N, but the expression is unwieldy and
unintuitive.  Better understanding can be obtained by taking the derivative of the first-order
condition with respect to the parameters of interest (g and Z).  The sign of these cross-derivatives
yields the sign of MN
*/Mg and MN
*/MZ.
18  The strategy requires signs for equations (7) and (8) as well
as a number of second derivatives.  The exercise also reveals an inherent instability of norm
systems.
Mv/MN:  Assuming a large upper bound on single parenthood utility (having s2 large is
sufficient for existence of the equilibrium; see the appendix), equation (8) is positive; raising the
norm increases violation.  This makes sense because a harsher norm is harder to follow, so more
people will violate it, and these violations will feed back into even more violations.  In Figure 2,
movements of N to the right increase the violation region R1 along its right and lower boundaries;18
the lower boundary effect is social feedback.  
Ml/MN:  These same effects, however, produce an ambiguous change in the total rate of lone
parenthood, given by regions R1 and R3 combined.  Movements of N to the right reduce lone
parenthood by expanding R2 at the expense of R3, but increase it by expanding R1 at the expense
of R2.  Thus if feedback (the R2 to R1 effect) is strong, making norms more harsh leads to
increases in lone parenthood.  This can also be seen in equation (7): the first term is the direct
effect of movement from R3 into R2, the second is the feedback effect from R2 into R1.  As the
quantity NNZ approaches zero, however, the feedback term vanishes, leaving the intuitive result
that harsher norms reduce lone parenthood.  
Most of the analysis from this point will rely on the following:
Assumption 1: NNZ is small enough that Ml/MN < 0.
The assumption can always be met by increasing the upper bound on income: Through the
normalization of the population space to 1, increases in y2 generate arbitrarily small values for N. 
Still, in real life the assumption may fail, and this has important policy implications.  Large
feedback means both high and counterintuitive sensitivity of norms to small shocks.  Rates of lone
parenthood are high enough in some societies (Sawhill, 1995) to suggest that high-feedback
regimes are possible.  
Second derivatives: From equations (7) and (8), we have:
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Here we see a second consequence of feedback, in that it introduces non-linearity, even here in
the linear utility version: the second derivative terms above explode as the feedback term NNZ
approaches one from below.  Further implications of instability will be discussed in the conclusion. 
From this point, however, analysis will focus on stable systems, so second derivative terms will be
considered small.
VI. The effect of lone-parent support on norms and lone parenthood
We can now examine the impact of policy changes on lone parenthood.  Consider first the
effect of lone parent support on the norm.  The derivative of (6) with respect to g is
The first term is positive, the primary tax effect of grants on norms.  Increasing grants raises
single parenthood, which raises the tax burden.  The median voter responds by calling for higher,
harsher norms.  The second term is negative, a secondary tax effect: increasing grants reduces the
power of the norm to reduce tax rolls; as the norm's anti-tax effectiveness weakens, the median
voter becomes more reluctant to use it; hence, the second term works against the first and could
dominate it.  The third term, also negative, is a secondary enforcement cost effect: raising grants
increases violations, which raises the cost of enforcing norms; as this cost rises, the cost of using
norms to fight taxation rises.  The median voter becomes more reluctant to raise the norm in order
to reduce taxes; hence, the third term works against the first and also could dominate it.  
Assuming stability, the second derivative are small and M
2U/MNMg > 0, which implies MN
*/Mg
> 0: grant decreases lead to softer norms.  The result is intuitive.  The median voter balances











below enforcement costs; lowering the norm increases tax costs and decreases enforcement costs;
the norm is lowered until the two costs are again equal.  
Still assuming stability, now consider the total effect of grant changes on lone parenthood. 
First, from (4) and (5), the lone parenthood rate can be rewritten as
The third term vanishes as social feedback (NNZ) goes to zero; under Assumption 1 its impact
will be small and can be ignored for ease of exposition.
20  Taking the derivative of (10) with
respect to g,
The first term is positive, the direct tax price effect of a grant increase: increased lone parent
support encourages lone parenthood for all under the poverty line, at an intensity determined by
the marginal utility of income.  The second term is negative because MN
*/Mg > 0; this is an indirect
norm effect indicating that raising grants causes a harsher norm, which in turn reduces lone
parenthood.  In effect, the norm system softens the impact of the grant increase, and may reverse
it if the norm effect is strong enough.  
Though intuitive, this dynamic is precisely opposite that assumed in the course of recent
welfare reform debates.  There, welfare cuts are supposed to help discourage lone parenthood by
making norms tougher.  Such an argument requires that welfare cuts toughen norms.  This
requires MN
*/Mg < 0, which requires that secondary effects in (9) dominate the primary effect.  












one way to get large secondary effects is to have large second derivative terms, which occurs
when social feedback is high.  High feedback, however, violates assumption 1, so that harsher
norms increase lone parenthood.  If so, then the way to use norms to reduce lone parenthood is to
make them softer, not tougher.  With MN
*/Mg < 0, making norms softer means welfare has to be
increased, not cut.  Welfare cuts being the argument's premiss, the argument has led to a
contradiction.  
A more plausible and coherent argument would hold that real-world systems are usually
stable, in which case secondary effects are small.  Then, welfare cuts soften norms, discouraging
lone parenthood directly but encouraging it indirectly.  
VII. The effect of community-building on norms and lone parenthood
The two community parameters, N and Z, appear in all the equations together.  Therefore,
a policy of strengthening community will have the same effect whether it focuses on increasing the
number of interactions people have (N), or on making those interactions more important (Z).  The
following concentrates on the latter.  
The derivative of (6) with respect to Z gives the effect of community on norms:
The first term is negative, the primary enforcement cost effect of community strength.  This effect
captures a simple idea: Greater interdependence makes enforcing a norm more costly for the
enforcers, because the cooperation one sacrifices is more important.  To reduce the enforcement
costs, the median voter desires a lower norm.  The second term is positive, a secondary









the norm on violation.  Potential violators face bigger punishments, therefore a smaller change in
N is necessary to arrive at the new violation rate called for by the primary effect.  This secondary
effect therefore weakens the power of the primary effect on the norm.  The third term is a
secondary tax effect.  Its sign depends on the sign of the second-derivative term, which is
negative under assumption 1 (see above).  In that case, the secondary tax effect is positive: bigger
punishments for violators strengthen the power of the norm against lone parenthood, and hence
lower tax burdens.  Having a stronger anti-tax weapon in hand, the median voter seeks to use it,
and is therefore reluctant to drive N all the way down to the point called for by the primary
enforcement cost effect.  
Assuming stability and hence small secondary effects, M
2U/MNMZ < 0, which implies MN
*/MZ
< 0.  Increasing interdependence makes norm enforcement costs bigger in equation (6); lowering
the norm reduces enforcement costs and increase tax burdens; therefore the median voter calls for
a lower norm until the two costs balance again.  Stronger communities choose softer norms;
weaker communities choose harsher norms.  
In a stable system, the total effect of community on lone parenthood can be found by
taking the derivative of (10) with respect to Z (again ignoring the third RHS term as above):
The first term in the numerator is negative, the direct enforcement price effect of an enhanced
community.  Stronger communities create higher costs of norm violation, which strengthens
norms and hence reduces lone parenthood.  Because MN*/MZ < 0, the second numerator term is23
positive, the indirect norm effect.  Because stronger communities relax their norms, the impact of
any community-building policy is weaker that the direct effect would indicate.  As with welfare
limits, the norm system resists policies.
Also as above, current welfare reform debates assume different dynamics, namely that
stronger communities will adopt tougher norms.  They will do so only if the secondary effects
dominate in (12), so that MN*/MZ > 0; this can happen under instability and high feedback; but high
feedback violates assumption 1 and implies that harsher norms increase rather than decrease lone
parenthood; in which case the way to cut lone parenthood is to weaken norms, not strengthen
them; with MN*/MZ > 0, this requires weaker communities, not stronger ones; the argument again
contradicts itself.  The only coherent argument holds that stronger communities in a stable norm
system will have stronger but softer norms. 
VIII. Summary
The paper has found flaws in the standard argument that limiting cash assistance to lone
parents and building their communities will toughen norms against lone parenthood.  The result
emerges from a model that formalizes several intuitive assumptions about the operation of social
norms: they create benefits and costs; cultural equilibria are induced by competing cultural
leaders; and competition ensures that actual norms balance benefits and costs for citizens in the
middle of the distribution of normative values.  When these assumptions hold, a low-cash, strong-
village approach to welfare reform will soften, not toughen, norms against lone parenthood.  
Moreover, there is no support here for general arguments that informal norm systems
provide important assistance to formal policy efforts.  Rather, norm systems often work against
policy intent, and they may be unstable.  Instability is a function of social feedback.  When one24
person's norm violation induces many violations by others, small policy changes produce large
norm changes, and theoretical predictions can be reversed.  There are no policies which can be
said to decrease lone parenthood with theoretical certainty.  Thus, norms constitute a source of
resistance and disruption in policy design and management.
This is not to say that a strategy of limiting welfare and empowering communities cannot
possibly reduce lone parenthood and other social problems.  It can, but only if direct price effects
dominate indirect norm effects, and then only if the norm system is stable.  
These findings challenge the broader debate about community, policy, and social problems
to consider different causal models.  The current model, that growing cash grants and weakening
communities led to soft norms which has led to social problems, appears to be based on spurious
correlations between these events, since the first step does not appear to be true.  Norms have
indeed softened, but probably for other reasons.  In equation (6), increasing prosperity (y) and
upward shifts in the underlying taste for socially costly behavior (s2) also soften norms.  Both
events probably explain some of the post-war growth in social problems, but they lead only to
controversial policy proposals: Reduce incomes (clearly not the answer), or subsidize institutions
that build character.25
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Appendix
Existence proof for the equilibrium in Section IV.
Overview.  
The proof uses backward induction, in 5 steps: A. RPD strategies are best responses given
the norm and the status of any two opponents as "conformists" and "violators."  B. Parenting
strategies maximize utility given the norm and the associated RPD payoffs.  C. Sincere voting is
undominated for all but the player at the median of the preferred norm distribution induced by
RPD payoffs and the frequency of lone parenthood.  For the median player, sincere voting is
optimal.  D. Given sincere voting, the preferred norm of the median voter is the optimal
announcement of both candidates.  E. There exist parameters such that the candidate's expectation
of the median ideal preferred norm is the actual median, and such that the induced tax levels and
violation rates are equal to their expectations. 
I use the shorthand "TFT" for the "Tit for Tat" strategy ("Cooperate in the first stage; then
do what your opponent did in the previous stage.").  "D" stands for the "Always Defect" strategy. 
A. Optimality of RPD strategies.  Because announcements and election outcomes are
common knowledge, and because incomes and parenting choices are common knowledge
between two RPD opponents, status as "conformist" or "violator" is accurately observed as of
stage 3.  (One could extend the model by having a probability of observation here.  It is easier,
however, to admit observation problems as a case in which the number of common-knowledge
partners, N, is small.)  As is well known, both D and TFT are best response strategies, and all
players know who will play what against them.  Violators expect D from everyone, and therefore29
do best to play D always.  Conformists expect D from violators and so play D against them.  They
expect TFT from other conformists and so play TFT against them.  This yields an RPD payoff of
0 per opponent for violators and Z = z/1-* per conformist, 0 per violator, for conformists.  
B. As of Stage 2, norm announcements and the election outcome are common knowledge;
the winner of the election announced the norm 8.  However, the identity of future RPD opponents
is unknown.  Since these are a random selection from a uniform population, they will also be
distributed uniformly on the same space as the population.  If the expected rate of violation in the
population is vi, then each player expects that viN of her future opponents will be violators.  A
conformist's expected RPD payoff is thus (1-vi)NZ.  Moreover, if the expected rate of lone
parenthood is li, then Ji = gli/r is the expected tax burden.  Given these expectations, the decision
rules in stage 2 do maximize utility as defined in equations (1) and (2).  
C. Given the RPD payoffs assigned to conformists and violators, and given the parenting
decisions that result, in Stage 1 the players can form expectations about the total utility they
would receive under each candidate's announced norm.  The norm of the candidate with the most
votes will take effect (8).  Under majority rule with sincere voting, the median voter is pivotal if
preferences are single-peaked (see below); in this large population, the probability of being pivotal
is virtually zero; therefore sincere voting is undominated.  For the pivotal voter, obviously, sincere
voting is the optimal strategy.  If both candidates announce the same norm, random voting is
undominated.  
Preferences over the norm will be single-peaked if M
2U/MN
2 < 0.  (The proof will only
identify sufficient conditions.)  The violation rate is30
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(assuming y1 = 0 without loss of generality).  For s2 sufficiently large, Mv/MN > 0 and M
2v/MN
2 > 0. 
The poverty lone parenthood rate is:





+ Mµ/MN.  Again for s2 sufficiently large, |M
2v/MN
2| > |Mµ/MN| so that M
2l/MN
2 > 0.  
A non-poor voter's total utility is
The first derivative of (A3) is
According to the equilibrium strategies, MF/MN = 1 if si = u(yi-c-J) - u(yi-J), 0 otherwise; the proof
holds regardless.  For those not indifferent, the second derivative of utility is
which under the assumptions above, is negative for sufficiently high s2.  Thus, a sufficiently high
upper bound on single-parenthood utility exists such that preferences are single-peaked. 31
D. Candidates.  Given sincere voting and single-peaked preferences, then, the median
voter theorem holds.  Announcing the expected ideal norm of the median voter is a best response
for both candidates.
E. Expectations.  It remains to show that all expectations are rational, that is, held
commonly by all the relevant actors, and equal to the actual outcomes produced by the
equilibrium.  I impose the former requirement and then show that parameters exist in which the
latter requirement is met.
Stage 0 (announcements): Let both candidates form a common expectation of the median





e.  Let each voter's ideal norm solve MU/MN = 0
(see equation A4).  Note that as M goes to infinity, the mass of the indifference frontier (those
with MF/MN ￿ 0) shrinks to zero.  Therefore M large implies that utility as defined in (A4)
incorporates all player strategies and expectations as a function of N.  Candidates thus can solve
(A4) for each y, and thereby derive the distribution of N
*(y).  Denote the median N
* and set N
e =
N
*.  Because it was derived from voter strategies and expectations, N
* will indeed be the median,
and candidate expectations will be rational.
Stage 1 (voting): Carrying out the same calculations, all voters are aware that N
* is the
median ideal norm.  They also know that both candidates have announced N
*.  Regardless of the
outcome of subsequent stages, voters will receive the same utility from both announcements. 
Therefore the expectation U(") = U($), held by all, is consistent with actual outcomes.
Stage 2 (lone parenthood): It only remains to show that the expected rate of violation (vi)
and the expected tax burden (Ji) at the start of stage 2 will cause parenting decisions that produce
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expected lone parenthood rate, however; hence it is equivalent to require l = li, all i, where li is the
expected lone parenthood rate.  
Assume for the moment that a rational expectation of the violation rate exists, and call it
v
*.  Then the rational expectation of l is li = l
*, all i, where
The integral term depends only on the norm, which is known, and model parameters.
To check for rational expectations regarding violation, first impose commonality, so that vi
= *, all i.  With these expectations, the rate of violation will be
A rational expectation of v will exist if there is a solution to (A7) when * = v.  Note that v'(*) > 0,
and v"(*) = 0.  Note further that v(1) < 1 since the size of the population has been normalized to
1, and some households - the non-poor - cannot violate the norm.  Finally, for sufficiently large
s2, v(0) > 0.  Therefore a unique value v
* exists such that v
* = v(v
*), and 0 < v
* < 1.  The
expectation vi = v
*, all i, is therefore rational.  #33
1. Welfare limits and community empowerment occupied center stage in the 1996 State of the
Union address of U.S. President Bill Clinton:  "The Congress and I are near agreement on
sweeping welfare reform.  We agree on time limits, tough work requirements, and the toughest
possible child support enforcement."  Later in the same speech: "Tonight I am pleased to
announce that a group of prominent Americans is ... forming an organization that will support
grass-roots community efforts all across our country in a national campaign against teen
pregnancy." (State of the Union address, January 23, 1996).  
2. These claims were made by candidates on both left and right in the course of the 1996
presidential campaign.  On the right, Republican nomination candidate Phil Gramm: "Government
programs established to help our people have changed the way we behave, corrupted our values
and diminished our virtue" (comments on February 24, 1996 at
http://politicsusa.com/PoliticsUSA/Issues/isel.cgi).  On the left, President Clinton: "For too long
our welfare system has undermined the values of family and work, instead of supporting them"
(State of the Union address, January 23, 1996).  
An alternative interpretation of these arguments is that they seek to change individual
preferences.  Assessing the role of policies in changing tastes is beyond the scope of the paper,
however.  Here, it will be assumed that policies are targeted at short-run changes in social
understandings of morality, rather than long-run changes in individual values.  
3. It should be stated at the outset that the objectives of the paper do not include building a
realistic model of the decisions that lead to low-income lone parenthood.  That is a very complex
affair, involving choices of childbirth, marriage, work, and education, under no small amount of
uncertainty.  Yet it is clear, and is implicit in the entire policy discussion from which this paper
draws its purpose, that the probability that one person becomes a lone parent does depend to
some extent on that person's decisions.  Taking this as given, the paper assumes that some people
are poor while others are not, that some people choose to be lone parents while others do not,
and that the decision to be a lone parent depends on whether or not you are poor.  Without any
loss of generality, such simplicity brings the basic issue here into sharpest relief, which is that
people can reduce the costs they impose on others if they wish, and whether they do so is
influenced by social norms and social policies.  Norms, policies, their interaction, and their
ultimate influence on behavior are the real objects of interest here; to keep them in focus, the
choice theory has been kept simple.
4. Social critics in the Habermas tradition (e.g. Knight, 1992; see Johnson, 1993) focus on the
power of elites to induce coordination equilibria, and overlook the fact that competition for elite
status must impose limits on this power.  
5. I assume uniform distributions to facilitate the calculation of lone parenthood rates, which
involve integrals over the population.  Using more realistic distributions would not fundamentally
alter the character of the results.
Endnotes34
6. In this model, lone parenthood creates only one social external cost, the tax.  However, one
could think of J as a measure of the total social external costs.  These costs are what make lone
parenthood a policy problem; implicit in this approach is the assumption that lone parenthood
among the rich is not a social problem.  In 1992, U.S. Vice President Dan Quayle criticized the
TV character Murphy Brown not because he believed her baby would cause problems for others,
but because the show sent a signal to people with fewer resources than Murphy Brown that lone
parenthood is not "wrong."  Quayle and the show's writers were evidently in a competition over
lone parenthood norms, much like that modeled in Section IV.  According to some reviews,
Quayle was right (Whitehead, 1993), but one could not say that he won the competition.  As of
this writing, he seems to have remained less popular than Murphy Brown.  
7. One could define the norm more realistically.  The degree of "wrongness" could rise
continuously as income deviates from N; "wrongness" could be defined in terms of other
characteristics than income; it could be associated with other behaviors.  In the real world the
pattern of social rights and wrongs is far more complex than it is here.  Moreover, in the real
world there is a distinction between social rights and wrongs and each person's perception of
objective Right and Wrong (if any).  Non-consequentialist morality is not ignored here, however. 
Rather, such values can be thought of as a random term in each person's utility over norms.  Since
the random term is non-consequentialist, it cannot be related in any systematic way to the
strategies of the various players.  Thus, policies affect cultural equilibria only through the
consequentialist aspects of individual morality (see note 13).  
8. See Section IV.
9. Assume sampling with replacement, so that the distribution of income and utilities in the
neighborhood is also uniform on [y1, y2] × [s1, s2].  In the case of one neighbor being chosen
more than once, the RPD payoffs of that interaction are multiplied.  This person simply becomes
an important neighbor.  
An interesting extension of the paper would allow endogenous neighborhoods.  So long as
sorting results in less than perfect isolation, however, it will be true that violating the common
norm across neighborhoods will be costly.  One way to think of isolated subcultures in the context
here is to think of the "neighborhood" as the group of outsiders with whom one has regular
contact.  If there are few of these, then N is small.  
10. One could allow these parameters to vary according to income, but it is not obvious that the
rich systematically interact more with one another than the poor, or vice versa.  The little
empirical evidence we have suggests that social capital has declined throughout the income
distribution, but that these declines hurt the poor more than others (Putnam, 1995).  Keeping the
parameters constant replicates this stylized fact, however, by making community more important
to the poor relative to their lower incomes.
11. It would be interesting to allow strategies in one matched pair to depend on strategies in
another.  One approach to this would be to treat a neighborhood as a network of interacting
strategies.  Another interesting change would have the neighborhoods clustered by income. 35
Neither innovation would change the results derived from this equilibrium, however.  Networking
would increase the importance of community enforcement and could be treated here simply as an
increase in Z.  Income sorting would not affect the strategies explored in this particular
equilibrium, with its single norm, but in future work it could be used to explore equilibria in which
different neighborhoods have different norms ("sub-cultures").  Both innovations would increase
the complexity of the model significantly and would be beyond the scope of the paper, however. 
Moreover, endogenous sorting into subcultures may not create norm-shaping pressures
fundamentally different from the endogenous sorting allowed here, into one of two electoral
camps.  Exploring more sophisticated institutions of cultural competition is surely a good area for
future work.
12. In this, the RPD mechanism matches well with research on social stigma.  Welfare recipients,
for example, report significant psychic costs but these do not appear to be caused by specific
incidents of scolding by strangers.  Rather, recipients come to feel uncomfortable in their
surroundings and out of step with society (Rank, 1994).  Though some of this might be purely
cognitive, surely much of it results from strained relationships between the stigmatized and the
community (Goffman, 1963).
13. This does not require that everyone is a utilitarian, only that everyone's ethical dispositions
consider benefits and costs in a neutral way.  Including non-consequentialist ethics, the ideal norm
distribution is found by making utilitarian calculations, then adding a random variable to each
person's ideal norm.  If the random term has a zero median (as it must if it is truly non-
consequentialist), the median of this new distribution will be the same as that of the pure
utilitarian distribution.  
14. This is intended to capture the idea that the set of policymakers is different from the set of
cultural leaders.  For example, in the U.S., the Congress has far more authority over the structure
of lone-parent support policies than the President, yet the President has far more power to
command the nation's ear.  It also replicates the property that policies usually have longer public
lives than their designers.
15. Limiting voting preferences to one issue dimension greatly reduces the problems inherent in
voting schemes as social choice mechanisms, of course.  In the real world, the presence of other
issues would give candidates a great deal more discretion over the norms they announce; they
would not be automatically forced to announce the median voter's ideal norm.  The same would
be true if candidates cared about the norm in addition to the desire to gain office.  Yet even here
cultural competition will restrict the range of values by changing the nomination of candidates for
office.  The median voter mechanism is just a simple way to capture the intuition that competition
dissipates cultural power.
16. MF/MN = 0 for all except those with y = s(y).  With M large, the indifferent population is
negligible; see appendix.36
17. In the nonlinear case, the distribution will be mixed: a spike at zero connected to a smooth
continuous pdf, with potentially another spike at B.
18. To see this, think of equation (6) as F(N,x) = 0 where x is a parameter of interest.  Because
MN/Mx = -Fx/FN, and FN < 0, sign(MN/Mx) = sign(Fx).  For FN < 0, see the appendix; this is just the
second order condition of the norm maximization problem.
19. To see this, consider Ml/MN, equation (7).  Assumption 1 asserts that NNZ is small, which
means that the second RHS term in (7) is small.  The derivative of (7) with respect to Z is
therefore dominated by the first RHS term, whose effect is negative.  Note that NNZ < 1.  
20. Its derivative with respect to g is positive; it strengthens the direct price effect of a grant
increase.